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UNION PACIFIC Ry. Co. v. LAPSLEYV.
Where a person accepts the gratuitous invitation of the owner and
driver of a vehicle to ride with him, and exercises no control over such
driver, the latter's negligence cannot be imputed to his guest so as to
defeat his recovery against a third person for injuries resulting from the
concurring negligence of the driver and such third person.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Action by James J. Lapsley, as administrat6r of the
estate of 'Eliza J. Lapsley, against the Union Pacific Ry.
Co. to recover damages for causing the death of his
intestate.
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff in the sum of
$Iooo. The evidence disclosed that decedent was 48 years
of age. The plaintiff was her brother, and lived in the
same neighborhood. A member of the family living at a
distance was ill, and decedent accepted an invitation of her
brother to go with him in his wagon to visit the sick
relative. On the return from the visit the accident hap-
pened by the train of defendant company running into the
wagon. No whistle or other signal was heard, and just as
tb team was on the track an approaching train was seen,
which struck the wagon and so seriously injured the
decedent, who was sitting on a back seat, that she died in
a few minutes. Both the plaintiff and his sister knew the
surroundings of the crossing, and they came down in the
wagon without stopping to look or listen.
The Court below 2 charged the jury that, if defendant
51 Fed. Rep., 174.
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was negligent in operating its railway, and that negligence
was the proximate cause of the injury, the plaintiff was
entitled to recover unless they found that decedent was
herself negligent, or controlled the driver, and he was new-
ligent as a result of that control, and such negligence%
contributed to tht injury.
To that portion of the charge exception was taken, and
a writ of error brought.
Judgment affirmed.
ImPUTATION oF NEGLIGENCE TO PASSENGER; How AvFzcTING His
RIGT oF ACTION AGAINST JOINT WRONG-DORRS.
In cases of injury by negligence
the usual course of inquiry is:
Is there any negligence by de-
fendant personally?
Is there any negligence by de-
fendant's servants?
Has that negligence, if any, been
wholly or partly a direct cause of
the accident?
Has plaintiff personally been
guilty of any negligence?
Has plaintiff, by his servants,
been guilty of any negligence?
Has that negligence, if any,
been either wholly or partly a
direct cause of the injury?
These questions are the neces-
sary forerunners of the vital prin-
ciple-which is the general law on
the subject-that a party who sus-
tains an injury from the careless-
ness or negligence of another may
maintain an action, unless he or
his servants have been guilty of
such negligence or want of due
care as contributed to the injury.
The common law applicable to
cases where a plaintiff has been
injured by negligence, and in the
course of which transaction there
have been negligent acts or omis-
sions by more than one person, is
stated thus by ESHNR, M. R. in
"The Bernina" (L. R. 12 Prob.
Div., 6I), afterward affirmed in the
House of Lords sub. nom., Mills v.
Armstrong, 13 App. CAs. 1.
(I) If no fault can be attributed
to the plaintiff, and there is negli-
genc6 by dbfendant and also by
another independent person, both
negligences in part directly caus-
ing the accident, the plaintiff can
maintain an action for all the
damages occasionedto him against
either defendant or wrong-doer.
(2) If, in the same case, the neg-
ligence is partly that of the de-
fendant personally, and partly that
of his servants, plaintiff can main-
tain an action either against d6-
fendant or his servants.
(3) If, in the same case, the neg-
ligence is that of defendant's ser-
vants, though there be no personal
negligence by defendant, plaintiff
can maintain . an action either
against defendant or his servants.
(4) If, in the same case, the leg-
ligence, though not that of the de-
fendant personally, or of a servant
of defendant, consists in an act or
omission by another, done or
omitted to be done by the order
or direction or authority of defend-
ant, plaintiff can maintain an
action either against defendant
personally or against the person
guilty of the negligence.
(5) If, although plaintiff has
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himself or by his servants been
guilty of negligence, such negli-
gence did not directly partly cause
the accident, and the alleged wrong-
doer might by reasonable care have
avoided the accident, plaintiff can
have an action against defendant.
The remainivg points in this
sub-division are expressed in the
general rule on the subject of con-
tributory negligence laid down
above. It is essential to state
these principles in order to have a
groundwork for the understanding
of the development of the law in
the case of concurrent negligence,
and the imputation of such negli-
gence, by various and intricate
interpretations of the courts of law
to an ordinarily disinterested plain-
tiff.
The case-which first touched the
fundamental principles above set
forth, and gave rise to a variety of
conflicting decisions, was that of
Thorogood v.'Bryan (8 C. B., 115)
(1849), in which the startling doc-
trine was announced that a pas-
senger upon the vehicle of a com-
mon carrier, who sustains an in-
jury which is the result of the
concurrent negligence of those in
charge of such vehicle and third
persons, is so identified with the
former as to be chargeable with
their negligence in an action
against the latter, and therefore
entitled only to recover damages
from his carrier. The facts of the
case were the simple ones of a col-
lision between passing omnibuses,
in one of which the plaintiff was
riding. Whatever question there
might have been as to the plain-
tiff's own personal negligence was
early eliminated from the case, and
it was decided solely on the ground
of the concurrent negligence of the
servants of the owners of the om-
nibus.
In plain truth, the judgment of
the Court in that case amounts to,
this: That the plaintiff passenger
made the driver of the vehicle his
agent to the extent of being liable
for the driver's acts; that by se-
lecting that particular vehicle to
transport him the plaintiff identi-
fied himself with the driver as to
be associated with him for the pur-
pose of barring any action against
wrong-doers on the ground of
contributory negligence.
By "identified" Powr.ocK, I.,
understood, not that plaintiff had
made the driver his agent, but
that he must be taken to be in the
same position as the owner of the
conveyance or his driver for the
purposes of the action. With this
variation, the decision was ap-
proved: Armstronge, R. R. (L. R.,
10, Exch., 47) 1875.
"Identified with the driver," "in
the same position with the driver,"
are useless and entertaining fictions
invented only to escape the inevi-
table conclusions resulting from
the principles of master and ser-
vant. It makes the driver a ser-
vant and yet not a servant at the
same time. The plaintiff must be
associated with the driver to incur
the penalfies of negligence, and
then disassociated when he should
wish to maintain an action against
the driver or the owner of the
vehicle. In other words, the in-
jured party, when suing one of
the wrong-doers, is barred by the
contributory negligence of his
"for-the-time-being" servant, and
can then sue his own servant alone,
"If he is dissatisfied with the
mode of conveyance, he is not
obliged to avail himself of it,' €
said MAULE, J., in Thorogood v.
Bryan, to sustain his' doctrine
that by the very selecion a rela-
tionship was created. But surely
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public policy must overrule this
reason when the helpless citizen is
obliged to take the only means at
hand for his transportation, and if
especially by so doing he assumes
to himself, along with a vehicle full
of other passengers, the responsi-
bility of the driver's negligence.
In a case in 1825 (Lavgher v.
Pointer, 5 B. & C., 547), the rela-
tionship arising from a hiring was
discussed in full. The defendant,
the owner of a carriage, hired a
pair of horses and a driver for one
day of a stable-keeper. The man
got no wages for his service, but a
gratuity dependent on the caprice
of the hirer. It was held the latter
was not liable for the driver's
negligence, on the ground that no
relation of master and servant ex-
isted.
Persons hiring job-horses, said
the Court, for a short time, cannot
be supposed to have any knowledge
of the. driver or any control over
him, and the public would, un-
doubtedly, suffer if the liability
were transferred to the hirer, prob-
ably unknown, from the owner of
thi horse.
So with the application of the
same reasoning to the plaintiff in
Thorogood v. Bryan, lie would be
responsible to third parties for in-
juries occasioned through the negli-
gence ofthe driver.
A distinction might be made be-
tween the two cases cited above,
in that the passenger in the omni-
bus had no control over the driver
at all, whereas in the hackney-
coach he could order the driver to
go where he pleased, and had more
than a qualified use of the vehicle.
This distinction is put with more
force in the later American deci-
sions in a complete separation of
the rule as respects public and
private carriers.
More strictly speaking, the driver
cannot be the servant of two peo-
ple. His relationship to passengem
and owner of the vehicle must be
fixed once for all, and not vary
with the circumstances of each
case. Carrying the rule in Thoro-
good v. Bryan to its absurd but
logical conclusion, a multiplicity
of actions would lawfully arise de-
pending on the different degrees of
negligence of each passenger with
the driver, as between passenger
and passenger, and third party in-
jured and passenger.
Movable property must, of neces-
sity, be sent out into the world by
the owner to be conducted and
cared for by-other persons, and to
prolong and multiply a relation so
arising between owner and servant
to chance strangers, wholly unin-
terested in the general scope of the
-employment, would be to delay
and harass the most common trans-
actions of life.
"Upon the principle that qui
facit per alium facit per se, the
master is responsible for the acts of
his servant; and that person is un-
doubtedly liable who stood in re-
lation of master to the wrong-doer.
He who had selected him as his
servant from the knowledge of, or
belief in, his skill and care, and
who could remove him for miscon-
duct, and whose orders he was
bound to receive and obey." Quar-
man v. Burnett,. 6 M. & W., 499
(184o).
Here wag a concise statement
of the legal relations, and the
liability arising through that rela-
tion must cease to exist when
the relations in real, physical
earnest, ceased to exist. No other
person than the master of such
servant is liable, on the simple
ground that the servant is the ser-
vant of another; consequently, a
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third person, entering into a con-
tract with the master, which con-
tract does not raise the relation of
master and servant at all, is not
thereby rendered liable, and to
make such person liable recourse
must be had to a different and
more extended principle, namely,
that a person is liable not only for
the acts of his own servant, but for
any injury which arises by the act
of another person, in carrying into
execution that which that other
person has contracted to do for his
benefit. -
The basis of the theory of master
and servant having fallen to the
ground in a series of decisions, it.
was attempted to sustain the iden-
tification of the passenger with the
driver in the more recent cases.
In Childs v. Hearn, L. R., 9
Exch., 176 (1874), the Court went
so far as to "identify" the plain-
tiff with the conveyance in which
he was riding, for the purpose of
the suit. If it was meant that the
carriage was under his control, it
was surely a mistake, as an impu-
tation of negligence cannot arise
through an inanimate object.
The doctrine of Thorogood v.
Bryan, with its companion case of
Cantlin v. Hills, was never adopted
in Scotland, nor by the English
Admiralty Court, and was never at
rest until it was overruled by the
Court of Appeals, without a dis-
senting voice, in the case of "The
Bernina" (.stilra).
It is rapidly fading out, and in
the United States, while a few
State courts yet make distinctions
to the broad rule, the bst judicial
decision is against it.
Courts of Admiralty, in cases of
collision when the injury has hap-
pened from negligence on both
sides, have adopted from the mari-
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time law the principle that lhe loss
shall be sustained equallyby both.
While Dr. Lushington, in the
case of "The Milan," Lush., 388
(186i), declined to be bound by
Thorogood v. Bryan, he gave plain-
tiff but half his loss against the de-
fendant upon this peculiar principle
of admiralty. But though this may
more nearly approximate justice
in many cases, it Xet fails to appor-
tion the loss according to the de-.
gree of negligence in each, and the
principle has never been adopted
by the common law, which looks
upon parties guilty of negligence
in such cases as wrong-doers; and
upon the ground, as it would seem,
that no man shall take advantage
of his own wrong, refuses to en-
force contribution among joint
wrong-doers, and will not appor-
tion the damages, although one
defendant is more culpable than
another.
"Herein lies the difficulty," was
said in R. R. v. Miller, 25 Mich.,
274 (1872), where an apportion-
ment was attempted to be made,
"which is inherent in the nature
of the subject, and the in-
firmity necessarily incident to all
human administration of justice-
the impossibility of ascertaining
what portion of the injury was
produced by the negligence of the
one, and what by that of the other,
and apportioning to each his just
share of liability." Where the in-
jury is the result of two concurring
causes, one party in fault is not
exempted from liability for it,
although another party may be
equally liable, states the law on
the subject: Ricker v. Freeman, 50
N. H., 420 (IS8 4 ); and the injured
party may sue both or either:
Tompkins v. Clay Street- Ry. Co.,
66 Cal., 163 (1884).
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In the United States there is no
court which still broadly adopts
the rule in.Thorogood v. Bryan, yet
there remain some States which
have made interesting variations
upon it. Those States are Wiscon-
sin, Michigan and Iowa.
All of them have wavered in
their decisions, notably New York
and Pennsylvania; and the most
steadfast has beep New Jersey. The
.space permitted this article will
not allow an adequate history of
the development of the law in the
different State courts, yet in all of
their decisions there runs the one
clear distinction of a positive dis-
affirmance of the rgle as concerns
,passengers in public conveyances,
and a variation of it (to be now ex-
plained) in respect to private
-vehicles.
In Pennsylvania the rule has
*met with many vicissitudes. The
earliest case, Lockhart v. Lichten-
thaler, 46 Pa. St., ii (1863), was
that of a passenger on the vehicle
of a common carrier injured by
the concurrent negligence of the
carrier and a third party. The
Court, while approving Thorogood
v. Bryan, did hot go as far in
reasoning out their decision to the
effect that only the carrier could
be sued. It expressly repudiated
the "identity" theory,,and based
its decision on grounds of public
policy, holding the carrier thus to
greater care and diligence.
"The third party is not compen-
sated, and should not be held to any
responsibility," said THOmPSON,
J. "This rule, it cannot be doubted,
will be more likely to increase dili-
gence than its opposite, which
would enable a negligent and faith-
less party to escape the conse-
quences of his want of care by
swearing it on to another, which
he would assuredly do if the temp-
tation and opportunity offered."
To these novel moral grounds were
added the reasons that the carrier
was liable to his employer at all
events, and to make his associate
in misconduct answerable for all
the consequences of it would make
one wrong-doer respond in place of
another for an injury which both
had committed. The justice of the
decision rested on the equitable
ground that the carrier should
answer for his employer rather
than one in whom the employer
reposed no confidence.
In the analysis of the case, the
Court'does not use the word "ser-
vant," but "employee."
It should be stated in connection
with this case and Simpson v.
Hand, 6 Whart., 311 (1841), that
the difference sought to be made
between a carrier of passengers and
of goods was one only of the
degree of responsibility, imputing
greater care to the former.
In imputing negligence to the
plaintiff the Court held there was
at least privity of contract between
him and the carrier of his goods
when he committed them to the
care of the latter, giving him
authority to assume a control over
them equal, to some extent, to that
of an agent.
Later cases in' Pennsylvania ex-
pressly disapprove Thorogood v.
Bryan, yet the Court assumes to
itself the power of imputing to the
plaintiff personal negligence in the
fact that while riding with i com-
panion driver he did not stop, look
and listen,las was his duty under
the law: Dean v. Penna. R. R. Co.,
129 Pa. St, 514 (1889); Crescent
City v. Anderson, 114 Pa. St., 643
(1886).
Where plaintiff had accepted an
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invitation to ride and was thrown
out owing to the wheel striking
against a stone in the highway, it
was held that if she exercised
reasonable care in the selection of
a driver, knowing the road as well
as he, his negligence could not be
imputed to her: Noyes v. Town of
Boscawen, 64 N. H., 361 (1887).
So, in Plimmer v. Ossipee, 59 N.
H., 55,-the husband was driving
and the wife was injured. The
question of the character of the
husband as a driver in the past
being raised, it was held that evi-
dence as to his safe driving was
relevant, and the element of iden-
tity or control did not enter into it.
There cannot be said to be con-
trol in the following cases:
-A vessel chartered for a day's ex-
cursion: Cpuddy v. Horn, 46 Mich.,
596 (1881).
A railway train: Chapman v.
New Haven R. R., 19 N. Y., 34r.
A street car: Bennett v. N. J. R.
R., 36 N. J. L., 225.
A stage coach: Turnpike Co. v.
Stewart, 2 Metc. (Ky.), 119.
The Iowa rule may be stated
thus: When several parties are en-
gaged in a common enterprise and
one is injured by the joint negli-
gence of one of his associates and
another, the negligence of his
associate will be imputed to him
and will defeat all right of recovery
against the other party, and when
a person is injured through the
common negligence of one who,
from their relation, is liound to care
for and protect him and another,
the negligence of the former will
be imputed to him, and will defeat
a recovery against the other party.
But in Nisbet v. the Town of
Garner, 75 Ia., 514 (iS88), the
Court refused to declare that, when
one rides in the vehicle of another,
the driver, as a matter of law, be-
comes his agent or servant in such
sense that his negligence, contrib-
uting to an injury, will be imputed
to him regardless of the real rela-
tion of the parties. The relation
of principal and agent must exist
in fact, and the law will not create
the relation from the mere fact
that the plaintiff accepted an invi-
tation of another to ride in his car-
riage. If he is but the guest of
the other, and neither has nor as-
sumes the right to direct or control
the conduct of the driver, neither
he nor the owner can be regarded
as his servant.
The negligence of the husband
was, nevertheless, imputed to the
wife, on the ground of the relation,
and the fact that she was under the
care of her husband: Yahn v. Ot-
tumwa, 6o Ia., 429 (1883). "When
paterfamilias drives his wife and
child in his own vehicle, he is
surely their agent in driving them
to charge them with his own neg-
ligence," is another shade of the
rule: Prideaux v. Mineral Point,
43 Wis., 513 (1878), in which State
no case affecting public convey-
ances seems to have arisen, and no
distinction was made between the
two in that cited.
Where the passenger is seated
away from the driver, or is sepa-
rated from him by an enclosure,
and is without opportunity to dis-
cover danger and to inform the
driver of it, no negligence can be
imputed to him: Brickell v. R. R.,
120 N. Y., 290 (1890).
But in a private conveyance, ir-
respective of any domestic or
fiduciary relation, the plaintiff is
bound to exercise ordinary care:
Dean v. R. R.,'129 Pa. St., 514;
R. R. Co. v. Kutac, i i S. W.
Repr. (Tex.), 127.
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Yet in Indiana the extent of im-
putable negligence is Iimited again
by the following principle: "Be-
fore the concurrent negligence of a
third person can be interposed to
shield another whose neglect of
- duty has occasioned an iniury to
one who was without personal
fault, it must appear that the per-
son injured and the one whose
negligence contributed to the in-
jury sustained such a relation to
each other, in respect to the matter
then in progress, as that, in con-
templation of the law, the negli-
gent act of the third person was,
upon the principles of agency, or
co-operation in a common or joint
enterprise, the act of the person
injured." In a case where this
rule was stated, the husband was
'the driver and the wife was in-
jured. In giving her judgment the
Coirt said she was a mere passive
guest, with as much authority to,
control. his movements as to an-
swer for his sins: Louisville N. A.
& C. Ry. Co. v. Creek, 29 N. E.
R., 481 (1892).
It did not appear how plaintiff
and driver came to be riding to-
gether, and the Court said that if
the plaintiff failed to use the care
which prudence required, relying
upon the vigilance of his compan-
ion, he must prove that the driver
was in the. exercise of due care:
Allyn v. R. R., 105 Mass., 79 (1870).
In Randolph v. O'Riorden, 29 N.
E. R., 584 Mass. (1892), the trial
judge charged that the jury could
find one or both defendants liable
in a joint action, and that only the
personal negligence of the plain-
tiff could defeat the action.
In a case in Ohio the plaintiff
was 16 years old, sui juris, and
was with her father, driving, when
the accident occurred. It was
held that his negligence could not
be imputed to her, there being no
evidence that she had not acted
with reasonable care, and no con-
trol being shown other than the
mere fact of relationship. It was
considered, but not decided,
whether the father would not
have been jointly liable with the
defendant wrong-doer: St. Clair
St. Ry. Co. v. :Eadie, 43 Ohio St.,
91 (I885).
It makes no difference whether
the defendant's act was a positive
act of negligence or whether he
only contributed to it by an act of
omission, throwing the greater de-
gree on the driver: Dyer v. Erie
Ry. Co., 71 N. Y., 228 (1877).
There being no reason why a
person should not have taken a
ride, knowing the driver to be a
reasonably prudent man-no rela-
tion of master and servant exist-
ing, no control being exercised, no
joint enterprise on foot, no willful
act of wrong-doing on the part of
the driver-negligence will not be
imputed, and, in the absence of his
own, a plaintiff can recover: Mas-
terson v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co.,
84 N. Y., 247 (1881); Bennett z. R.
R., 36,N. J. L., 225 (1873); Brannen
v. Kokomo Co., 17 N. E. R., 202
(1888), Ind.; Little v. Hackett, 116
U. S., 366 (1886); State v. B. & M.
R. R. Co., 86 Me., 430 (1888).
ALEXANDER DURBIN LAUBR.
